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Abstract 
This paper summarizes efforts to computationally mod-
el two transitions in the evolution of human creativity: 
its origins about two million years ago, and the ‘big 
bang’ of creativity about 50,000 years ago. Using a 
computational model of cultural evolution in which 
neural network based agents evolve ideas for actions 
through invention and imitation, we tested the hypothe-
sis that human creativity began with onset of the capaci-
ty for recursive recall. We compared runs in which 
agents were limited to single-step actions to runs in 
which they used recursive recall to chain simple actions 
into complex ones. Chaining resulted in higher diversi-
ty, open-ended novelty, no ceiling on the mean fitness 
of actions, and greater ability to make use of learning. 
Using a computational model of portrait painting, we 
tested the hypothesis that the explosion of creativity in 
the Middle/Upper Paleolithic was due to onset of con-
textual focus: the capacity to shift between associative 
and analytic thought. This resulted in faster conver-
gence on portraits that resembled the sitter, employed 
painterly techniques, and were rated as preferable. We 
conclude that recursive recall and contextual focus pro-
vide a computationally plausible explanation of how 
humans evolved the means to transform this planet. 
 Introduction 
To gain insight into the mechanisms underlying creativity, 
one might start by testing peoples’ creative abilities, per-
haps using technologies such as fMRI, or dissect the brains 
of people who were known to be particularly creative dur-
ing their lifetimes. However, to gain insight into the evolu-
tion of creativity, these options do not exist. All that is left 
of our prehistoric ancestors are their bones and artifacts 
such as stone tools that resist the passage of time. Thus to 
understand the evolution of creativity, computational mod-
eling is virtually the only scientific tool we have. 
 Humans are not only creative; we put our own spin on 
the inventions of others, such that new inventions build 
cumulatively on previous ones. This cumulative cultural 
change is referred to as the ratchet effect (Tomasello, Kru-
ger, & Ratner, 1993), and it has been suggested that it is 
uniquely human (Donald, 1991). A mathematical model of 
two transitions in the evolution of the cognitive mecha-
nisms underlying creativity has been put forward (Gabora 
& Aerts, 2009). Computational models of these mecha-
nisms have also been developed (DiPaola & Gabora, 2007, 
2009; Gabora, 1995, 2008a,b; Gabora & Leijnen, 2009; 
Leijnen & Gabora, 2009, 2010; Gabora & Saberi, 2011). 
However, these efforts used different modeling platforms, 
and because the aims underlying them have been part sci-
entific and part artistic, their relevance to each other, and to 
an overarching research program has not previously been 
made clear. The goal of this paper is to explain how, to-
gether, they constitute an integrated effort to computation-
ally model the evolution of human creativity.  
First Transition:  
The Earliest Signs of Creativity 
The minds of our earliest ancestors, Homo habilis, have 
been referred to as episodic because there is no evidence 
that they deviated from the present moment of concrete 
sensations (Donald, 1991). They could encode perceptions 
of events in memory, and recall them in the presence of a 
cue, but had little voluntary access to memories without 
environmental cues. They were therefore unable to shape, 
modify, or practice skills and actions, and unable to invent 
or refine complex gestures or vocalizations. 
Homo erectus lived between approximately 1.8 and 0.3 
million years ago. The cranial capacity of the Homo erec-
tus brain was approximately 1,000 cc, about 25% larger 
than that of Homo habilis, at least twice as large as that of 
living great apes, and 75% that of modern humans (Ruff et 
al., 1997). This period is widely referred to as the begin-
nings of cumulative culture. Homo erectus exhibited many 
indications of enhanced intelligence, creativity, and ability 
to adapt to their environment, including sophisticated, task-
specific stone hand axes, complex stable seasonal home 
bases, and long-distance hunting strategies involving large 
game, and migration out of Africa. 
This period marks the onset of the archaeological record 
and it is thought to be the beginnings of human culture. It 
is widely believed that this cultural transition reflects an 
underlying transition in cognitive or social abilities. Some 
have suggested that they owe their achievements to onset 
of theory of mind (Mithen, 1998) or the capacity to imitate 
(Dugatkin, 2001). However, there is evidence that other 
species possess theory of mind and the capacity to imitate 
(Heyes, 1998), yet do not compare to modern humans in 
intelligence and cultural complexity. 
  
Evolutionary psychologists have suggested that the intel-
ligence and cultural complexity of the Homo line is due to 
the onset of massive modularity (Buss, 1999, 2004; Bar-
kow, Cosmides, &Tooby, 1992). However, although the 
mind exhibits an intermediate degree of functional and 
anatomical modularity, neuroscience has not revealed vast 
numbers of hardwired, encapsulated, task-specific mod-
ules; indeed, the brain has been shown to be more highly 
subject to environmental influence than was previously 
believed (Buller, 2005; Byrne, 2000; Wexler, 2006). 
A Promising and Testable Hypothesis 
Donald (1991) proposed that with the enlarged cranial ca-
pacity of Homo erectus, the human mind underwent the 
first of three transitions by which it—along with the cul-
tural matrix in which it is embedded—evolved from the 
ancestral, pre-human condition. This transition is charac-
terized by a shift from an episodic to a mimetic mode of 
cognitive functioning, made possible by onset of the capac-
ity for voluntary retrieval of stored memories, independent 
of environmental cues. Donald refers to this as a self-
triggered recall and rehearsal loop. Self-triggered recall 
enabled information to be processed recursively with re-
spect to different contexts or perspectives. It allowed our 
ancestor to access memories voluntarily and thereby act 
out1 events that occurred in the past or that might occur in 
the future. Thus not only could the mimetic mind tempo-
rarily escape the here and now, but by miming or gesture, 
it could communicate similar escapes in other minds. The 
capacity to mime thus ushered forth what is referred to as a 
mimetic form of cognition and brought about a transition to 
the mimetic stage of human culture. The self-triggered 
recall and rehearsal loop also enabled our ancestors to en-
gage in a stream of thought. One thought or idea evokes 
another, revised version of it, which evokes yet another, 
and so forth recursively. In this way, attention is directed 
away from the external world toward one’s internal model 
of it. Finally, self-triggered recall allowed for voluntary 
rehearsal and refinement of actions, enabling systematic 
evaluation and improvement of skills and motor acts. 
Computational Model 
Donald’s hypothesis is difficult to test directly, for if cor-
rect it would leave no detectable trace. It is, however, pos-
sible to computationally model how the onset of the capac-
ity for recursive recall would affect the effectiveness, di-
versity, and open-endedness of ideas generated in an artifi-
cial society. This section summarizes how we tested Don-
ald’s hypothesis using an agent-based computational model 
of culture referred to as ‘EVOlution of Culture’, abbreviat-
ed EVOC. Details of the modeling platform are provided 
elsewhere (Gabora, 2008b, 2008c; Gabora & Leijnen, 
2009; Leijnen & Gabora, 2009). 
                                                
1 The term mimetic is derived from “mime,” which means 
“to act out.” 
The EVOC World. EVOC uses neural network based 
agents that (i) invent new ideas, (ii) imitate actions imple-
mented by neighbors, (iii) evaluate ideas, and (iv) imple-
ment successful ideas as actions. Invention works by modi-
fying a previously learned action using learned trends 
(such as that more overall movement tends to be good) to 
bias the invention process. The process of finding a neigh-
bor to imitate works through a form of lazy (non-greedy) 
search. An imitating agent randomly scans its neighbors, 
and adopts the first action that is fitter than the action it is 
currently implementing. If it does not find a neighbor that 
is executing a fitter action than its own action, it continues 
to execute the current action. Over successive rounds of 
invention and imitation, agents’ actions improve. EVOC 
thus models how descent with modification occurs in a 
purely cultural context. Agents do not evolve in a biologi-
cal sense–they neither die nor have offspring–but do in a 
cultural sense, by generating and sharing ideas for actions.  
Following Holland (1975) we refer to the success of an 
action in the artificial world as its fitness, with the caveat 
that unlike its usage in biology, here the term is unrelated 
to number of offspring (or ideas derived from a given 
idea). The fitness function (FF) was originally chosen be-
cause it allows investigation of biological phenomena such 
as underdominance and epistasis in a cultural context (see 
Gabora, 1995); the one used here is one over several used 
in EVOC (see Gabora, 2008 for others). The FF rewards 
head immobility and symmetrical limb movement. Fitness 
of actions starts out low because initially all agents are 
entirely immobile. Soon some agent invents an action that 
has a higher fitness than doing nothing, and this action gets 
imitated, so fitness in- creases. Fitness increases further as 
other ideas get invented, assessed, implemented as actions, 
and spread through imitation. The diversity of actions ini-
tially increases due to the proliferation of new ideas, and 
then decreases as agents hone in on the fittest actions. 
We used was a toroidal lattice with 100 nodes, each oc-
cupied by a single, stationary agent, and a von Neumann 
neighborhood structure (agents only interacted with their 
four adjacent neighbors). During invention, the probability 
of changing the position of any body part involved in an 
action was 1/6. On each run, creators and imitators were 
randomly dispersed. 
Chaining. This gives agents the opportunity to execute 
multi-step actions. For the experiments reported here with 
chaining turned on, if in the first step of an action an agent 
was moving at least one of its arms, it executes a second 
step, which again involves up to six body parts. If, in the 
first step, the agent moved one arm in one direction, and in 
the second step it moved the same arm in the opposite di-
rection, it has the opportunity to execute a three-step ac-
tion. And so on. The agent is allowed to execute an arbi-
trarily long action so long as it continues to move the same 
arm in the opposite direction to the direction it moved pre-
viously. Once it does not do so, the chained action comes 
to an end. The longer it moves, the higher the fitness of this 
  
multi-step chained action. Where n is the number of 
chained actions, the fitness, Fc, is calculated as follows: 
 
Fc = Fnc+ (n – 1) 
 
The fitness function with chaining provides a simple means 
of simulating the capacity for recursive recall. 
‘Origins of Creativity’ Results 
As shown in Figure 1, the capacity to chain simple actions 
into more complex ones increases the mean fitness of ac-
tions in the society. This is most evident in the later phase 
of a run. Without chaining, agents converge on optimal 
actions, and the mean fitness of action reaches a plateau. 
With chaining, however, there is no ceiling on the mean 
fitness of actions. By the 100th iteration it reached almost 
15, indicating a high incidence of chaining.  
 
 
Figure 1. Mean fitness of actions in the artificial society with 
chaining versus without chaining. 
 
As shown in Figure 2, chaining also increases the diversity 
of actions. This is most evident in the early phase of a run 
before agents begin to converge on optimal actions. Alt-
hough in both cases there is convergence on optimal ac-
tions, without chained actions, this is a static set (thus 
mean fitness plateaus) whereas with chained actions the set 
of optimal actions is always changing, as increasingly fit 
actions are found (thus mean fitness keeps increasing). 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean number of different actions in the artificial 
society with chaining (continuous line) versus without chain-
ing (dashed line). 
 
Recall that agents can learn trends from past experiences 
(using the knowledge-based operators), and thereby bias 
the generation of novelty in directions that have a greater 
than chance probability of being fruitful. Since chaining 
provides more opportunities to capitalize on the capacity to 
learn, we hypothesized that chaining would accentuate the 
impact of learning on the mean fitness of actions, and this 
too turned out to be the case (Gabora & Saberi, 2011).  
Second Transition:  
The ‘Big Bang’ of Human Creativity 
The European archaeological record indicates that a truly 
unparalleled cultural transition occurred between 60,000 
and 30,000 years ago at the onset of the Upper Paleolithic 
(Bar-Yosef, 1994; Klein, 1989; Mellars, 1973, 1989a, 
1989b; Soffer, 1994; Stringer & Gamble, 1993). Consider-
ing it “evidence of the modern human mind at work,” 
Richard Leakey (1984:93-94) describes the Upper Palaeo-
lithic as follows: “unlike previous eras, when stasis domi-
nated, ... [with] change being measured in millennia rather 
than hundreds of millennia.” Similarly, Mithen (1996) re-
fers to the Upper Paleaolithic as the ‘big bang’ of human 
culture, exhibiting more innovation than in the previous six 
million years of human evolution. We see the more or less 
simultaneous appearance of traits considered diagnostic of 
behavioral modernity. It marks the beginning of a more 
organized, strategic, season-specific style of hunting in-
volving specific animals at specific sites, elaborate burial 
sites indicative of ritual and religion, evidence of dance, 
magic, and totemism, the colonization of Australia, and 
replacement of Levallois tool technology by blade cores in 
the Near East. In Europe, complex hearths and many forms 
of art appeared, including cave paintings of animals, deco-
rated tools and pottery, bone and antler tools with engraved 
designs, ivory statues of animals and sea shells, and per-
sonal decoration such as beads, pendants, and perforated 
animal teeth, many of which may have indicated social 
status (White, 1989a, 1989b).  
 Whether this period was a genuine revolution culminat-
ing in behavioral modernity is hotly debated because 
claims to this effect are based on the European Palaeolithic 
record, and largely exclude the African record (McBrearty 
& Brooks, 2000); Henshilwood & Marean, 2003). Indeed, 
most of the artifacts associated with a rapid transition to 
behavioral modernity at 40–50,000 years ago in Europe are 
found in the African Middle Stone Age tens of thousands 
of years earlier. However the traditional and currently 
dominant view is that modern behavior appeared in Africa 
between 50,000 and 40,000 years ago due to biologically 
evolved cognitive advantages, and spread replacing exist-
ing species, including the Neanderthals in Europe (e.g., 
Ambrose, 1998; Gamble, 1994; Klein, 2003; Stringer & 
Gamble, 1993). Thus from this point onward there was 
only one hominid species: modern Homo sapien. Despite 
lack of overall increase in cranial capacity, the prefrontal 
  
cortex, and particularly the orbitofrontal region, increased 
significantly in size (Deacon, 1997; Dunbar, 1993; Jerison, 
1973; Krasnegor, Lyon, and Goldman-Rakic, 1997; 
Rumbaugh, 1997) and it was likely a time of major neural 
reorganization (Klein, 1999; Henshilwood, d’Errico, 
Vanhaeren, van Niekerk, and Jacobs, 2000; Pinker, 2002).  
 Given that the Middle/Upper Palaeolithic was a period 
of unprecedented creativity, what kind of cognitive pro-
cesses may have been involved? 
A Testable Hypothesis 
Converging evidence suggests that creativity involves the 
capacity to shift between two forms of thought (Finke, 
Ward, & Smith, 1992; Gabora, 2003; Howard-Jones & 
Murray, 2003; Martindale, 1995; Smith, Ward, & Finke, 
1995; Ward, Smith, & Finke, 1999). Divergent or associa-
tive processes are hypothesized to occur during idea gener-
ation, while convergent or analytic processes predominate 
during the refinement, implementation, and testing of an 
idea. It has been proposed that the Paleolithic transition 
reflects a mutation to the genes involved in the fine-tuning 
of the biochemical mechanisms underlying the capacity to 
subconsciously shift between these modes, depending on 
the situation, by varying the specificity of the activated 
cognitive receptive field. This is referred to as contextual 
focus2 because it requires the ability to focus or defocus 
attention in response to the context or situation one is in. 
Defocused attention, by diffusely activating a broad region 
of memory, is conducive to divergent thought; it enables 
obscure (but potentially relevant) aspects of the situation 
thus come into play. Focused attention is conducive to 
convergent thought; memory activation is constrained 
enough to hone in and perform logical mental operations 
on the most clearly relevant aspects. 
Support from Computational Model 
Again, because it would be difficult to empirically deter-
mine whether Paleolithic humans became capable of con-
textual focus, we decided to begin by determining whether 
the hypothesis is at least computational feasible. To do so 
we used an evolutionary art system that generated progres-
sively evolving sequences of artistic portraits, with no hu-
man intervention once initiated. We sought to determine 
whether incorporating contextual focus into the fitness 
function would play a crucial role in enabling the computer 
system to generate art that humans find "creative" (i.e. pos-
sessing qualities of novelty and aesthetic value typically 
ascribed to the output of a creative artistic process). 
We implemented contextual focus in the evolutionary art 
algorithm by giving the program the capacity to vary its 
level of fluidity and control over different phases of the 
creative process in response to the output it generated. The 
                                                
2 In neural net terms, contextual focus amounts to the ca-
pacity to spontaneously vary the shape of the activation 
function, flat for divergent thought and spiky for analytical. 
creative domain of portrait painting was chosen because it 
requires both focused attention and analytical thought to 
accomplish the primary goal of creating a resemblance to 
the portrait sitter, as well as defocused attention and asso-
ciative thought to deviate from resemblance in a way that 
is uniquely interesting, i.e., to meet the broad and often 
conflicting criteria of aesthetic art. Since judging creative 
art is subjective, rather than use quantitative analysis, a 
representative subset of the automatically produced art-
work from this system was selected, output to high quality 
framed images, and submitted to peer reviewed and com-
missioned art shows, thereby allowing it to be judged posi-
tively or negatively as creative by human art curators, re-
viewers and the art gallery going public. 
 Our strategy for modeling contextual focus may raise 
questions about the ability of computers to "truly" be crea-
tive, and the role of the human system designer in the crea-
tive output. Several researchers in computational creativity, 
have addressed such questions by outlining different di-
mensions of creativity and proposing schema for evaluat-
ing a "level of creativity" of a given system, for example 
(Ritchie, 2007; Jennings, 2010; Colton, Pease, & Charnley, 
2011). We are interested in applying such analyses to our 
portrait-system as a possibility for future work; indeed, the 
mechanics of contextual focus might be clarified by the 
computational creativity literature. In particular we are 
interested in further exploring the link between system-
modified fitness constraints and the idea of transformation-
al creativity (Boden, 2003; Wiggins 2006). 
 However, for the purposes of the current paper, it is less 
important to address the question of designer involvement 
in system creativity, or to try and quantify the amount of 
creativity displayed. Rather, we concentrate on the qualita-
tive impact made by the explicit incorporation of contextu-
al focus into the system as a whole, and its ability to ele-
vate the perceived quality and novelty of system output to 
a level audiences judged reminiscent of successful "artistic, 
human-style" creativity.  
 Generative Art Systems: Creative evolutionary sys-
tems are a class of search algorithms inspired by Darwini-
an evolution, the most popular of which are genetic algo-
rithms (GA) and genetic programming (GP) (Koza, 1993). 
These techniques solve complex problems by encoding a 
population of randomly generated potential solutions as 
‘genetic instruction sets’, assessing the ability of each to 
solve the problem using a predefined fitness function, mu-
tating and/or marrying (applying crossover to) the best to 
yield a new generation, and repeating until one of the off-
spring yields an acceptable solution. We are not claiming 
that contextual focus is Darwinian, but simply that for our 
computational modeling purposes, Genetic Programming 
proved a convenient foundational aggregator to support our 
contextual focus fitness function module. 
 Typically these systems allow a human user to pick 
those individuals that will be mated – making the human 
the creative judge. In contrast, our system used a function 
trigger mechanism within the contextual focus fitness func-
  
tion which allowed the process to run automatically, with-
out any human intervention once the process was started. It 
was not until the evolutionary art process came to comple-
tion that humans looked at and evaluated the art. Others 
have begun to use creative evolutionary systems with an 
automatic fitness function in design and music, as well as 
in a creative invention machine (Bentley, Corne, 2002). 
What is unique in our approach is that it incorporates sev-
eral techniques that enable it to shift to processing artistic 
content in a more divergent or associative manner, and 
employs a form of GP called Cartesian Genetic Program-
ming (Miller, 2011), detailed in the next section. 
 Implementation: The GP function set has 13 functions 
which use unitized x and y positions of the portrait image 
as variables and additional parameter variables (noted PM) 
that can be affected by adaptive mutation. Functions are 
low level in nature which aids in a large ‘creative’ search 
space, and output HSV color space values between 0 and 
255. An individual in our population is manifested as one 
program that runs successively for every pixel in the output 
image, which is then tested against our creative fitness 
function. This allows correlated painterly effects as one 
moves through the image. Functions 1 through 5 use sim-
ple logical or arithmetic manipulations of the positions 
(low level functions create a larger ‘creative’ search space), 
whereas 7 through 14 use trigonometric or logical func-
tions that are more related to geometric shapes and color 
graduations. The 13 functions of the function set are:  
 
1: x|y;  
2: PM & x;  
3: (x ? y) % 255;  
4: if (x[y) x - y; else y - x;  
5: 255 - x;  
6: abs (cos (x) * 255);  
7: abs (tan (((x % 45) * pi)/180.0) * 255));  
8: abs (tan (x) * 255) % 255);  
9: sqrt ((x - PM)2 ? (y - PM) 2); (thresholded at 255)  
10: x % (PM? 1) ? (255 - PM);  
11: (x ? y)/2;  
12: if (x[y)255*((y ? 1)/(x ? 1)); else 255*((x ? 1)/(y ? 1));  
13: abs (sqrt (x – PM2? y – PM2) % 255);  
 
 The contextual focus based fitness function varies flu-
idly from tightly focusing on resemblance (similarity to the 
sitter image, which in this case is an image of Charles 
Darwin), to swinging (based on functional triggers) toward 
a more associative process of the intertwining, and at times 
contradicting, ‘rules’ of abstract portrait painting. Different 
genotypes map to the same phenotype. This allows us to 
vary the degree of creative fluidity because it offers the 
capacity to move though the search space via genotype 
(small ordered movement) or phenotype (large movement 
but still related). For example, in one set of experiments 
this is implemented as follows: if the fittest individual of a 
population is identical to an individual in the previous gen-
eration for more than three iterations, meaning the algo-
rithm is stuck in analytic mode and needs to open up, other 
genotypes that map to this same phenotype are chosen over 
the current non-progressing genotype, allowing divergent 
open movement through the landscape of possibilities.  
 The automatic fitness function partly uses a ‘portrait to 
sitter’ resemblance. Since the advent of photography (and 
earlier), portrait painting has not just been about accurate 
reproduction, but also about using modern painterly goals 
to achieve a creative representation of the sitter. The fitness 
function primarily rewards accurate representation, but in 
certain situations also rewards visual painterly aesthetics 
using simple rules of art creation as well as a portrait 
knowledge space. Specifically, the divergent painterly por-
tion of the fitness function takes into account: (1) face ver-
sus background composition, (2) tonal similarity over exact 
color similarity, matched with a sophisticated artistic color 
space model that weighs for warm-cool color temperature 
relationships based on analogous and complementary color 
harmony rules, and (3) unequal dominate and subdominant 
tone and color rules, and other artistic rules based on a por-
trait painter knowledge domain as detailed in (DiPaola, 
2009) and illustrated in Figure 3. The system is biased to-
ward resemblance, which gives it structure, but can, under 
the influence of functional triggers, exhibit artistic flair.  
 
 
Figure 3. The contextual focus fitness function mimics human 
creativity by moving between restrained focus (resemblance) 
to more unstructured associative focus (resemblance + am-
biguous art rules of composition, tonality and color theory). 
 
The fitness function calculates four scores (resemblance 
and the three painterly rules), and then combines them in 
different ways to mimic human creativity, shifting between 
unstructured associative focus (rules of composition, tonal-
ity and color theory) and restrained focus (resemblance). In 
its default state, the fitness function uses a more analytic 
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form of processing, specifically, a ratio of 80% resem-
blance to 20% non-proportional scoring of the three paint-
erly rules. Several functional triggers can alter this ratio in 
different ways, but the main trigger is when the system is 
“stuck”. Within any run, for instance as long as an adaptive 
percentage of 80–20 resemblance bias is maintained (re-
semblance patriarchs), the system will allow very high 
scoring of painterly rule individuals to be accepted into the 
next population. Those with high painterly scores 
(weighted non-proportionally including for a very high 
score with respect to just one rule) are saved separately, 
and mated with the current 80/20 population. Unless other 
triggers exist, their offspring are still tested with the 80–20 
resemblance test. System wide functional changes occur 
when redundancy triggers affect the default ratio for all 
individuals. As mentioned previously, when a plateau or 
local minimum is reached for a certain number of popula-
tions, the fitness function ratio switches such that painterly 
rules are weighted higher than resemblance (on a sliding 
scale), and work in conjunction with redundancy at the 
input, node, and functional levels. Similarly, but now in 
reverse, to the default resemblance situation, high scoring 
resemblance individuals can pass into the next population 
when a percentage of painterly rule individuals is met. Us-
ing this more associative mode, high resemblance individ-
uals are always part of the mix, and when these individuals 
show a marked improvement, a trigger is set to return to 
the more focused 80/20 resemblance ratio.  
As the fitness score increases, portraits look more like 
the sitter. This gives us a somewhat known spread from 
very primitive (abstract) all the way through to realistic 
portraits. Thus in effect the system has two ongoing pro-
cesses: (1) those ‘most fit’ portraits that pass on their por-
trait resemblance strategies, making for more and more 
realistic portraits—the family ‘resemblance’ patriarchs, 
and (2) the creative ‘strange uncles’: related to the current 
‘resemblance fit’, but portraits that are more artistically 
creative or ‘artistically fit’. This dual evolving technique of 
‘patriarchs and strange uncles’ mimics the interplay be-
tween freedom and constraint that is so central to creativi-
ty. Paradoxically, novelty often benefits from the existence 
of a known framework reference system to rebel and inno-
vate from. Creative people use some strong structural rules 
(as in the templates of a sonnet, tragedy, or in this case, a 
resemblance to the sitter image) as a resource or base to 
elaborate new variants beyond that structure (in this case, 
an abstracted variation of the sitter image).  
 
‘Big Bang of Creativity’ Results 
The automatic creative output was generated over thirty 
days of continuous, un-supervised computer use. The im-
ages in Figure 4 show a selection of representative portraits 
produced by the system. While the overall population im-
proves at resembling Darwin’s portrait, what is more inter-
esting to us is the variety of recurring, emergent and 
merged creative strategies that evolve as the programs in 
different ways to become better abstract portraitists.  
 
 
Figure 4. These images have been seen by thousands in the 
last 2 years and have been perceived as creative art works on 
their own by the art public, including above at the MIT Mu-
seum in Cambridge, MA. 
 
Humans rated the portraits produced by this version of 
the portrait painting program with contextual focus as 
much more creative and interesting than a previous version 
that did not use contextual focus, and unlike its predeces-
sor, the output of this program generated public attention 
worldwide. Example pieces were framed and submitted to 
galleries as a related set of work. Care was taken by the 
author to select representational images of the evolved un-
supervised process, however creative human bias obvious 
exists in the representational editing process. Output has 
been accepted and exhibited at six major galleries and mu-
seums including the TenderPixel Gallery in London, Emily 
Carr Galley in Vancouver, and Kings Art Centre at Cam-
bridge University as well as the MIT Museum, and the 
High Museum in Atlanta, all either peer reviewed, juried or 
commissioned shows from institutions that typically only 
accept human art work. A typical gallery installation con-
sisted of 40-70 related portraits produced in time order 
over a given run. Gallery showings focus on “best resem-
blances” and those that are artistically compelling from an 
abstract portrait perspective. This gallery of work has been 
seen by tens of thousands of viewers who have commented 
that they see the artwork as an aesthetic piece that ebb and 
flows through seemly creative ideas even though they were 
solely created by an evolutionary art computer program 
using contextual focus. Note that no attempt to create a 
pure ‘creativity Turning Test’ was attempted. Besides the 
issues surrounding the validity of such a test (Pease, Col-
ton, 2011), it was not feasible in such reputable and large 
art venues. However most of the thousands of causal view-
ers assumed they were looking at human created art. The 
work was also selected for its aesthetic value to accompany 
an opinion piece in the journal Nature (Padian, 2008), and 
was given a strong critical review by the Harvard humani-
  
ties critic, Browne (2009). While these are subjective 
measures, they are standard in the art world. The fact that 
the computer program produced novel creative artifacts, 
both as single art pieces and as a gallery collection of piec-
es with interrelated themes, using contextual focus as a key 
element of its functioning, is compelling evidence of the 
effectiveness of contextual focus.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
Many species engage in acts that could be said to be crea-
tive. However, humans are unique in that our creative ideas 
build on each other cumulatively; indeed it is for this rea-
son that culture is widely construed as an evolutionary pro-
cess (e.g. Bentley, Ormerod, & Batty, 2011; Cavalli-Sforza 
& Feldman, 1981; Gabora, 1996, 2008; Hartley, 2009; 
Mesoudi, Whiten & Laland, 2006; Whiten, Hinde, Laland, 
& Stringer, 2011). Our creativity is evident in all walks of 
life. It has transformed the planet we live on.  
We discussed two transitions in the evolution of unique-
ly cumulative form of creativity, discussed cognitive 
mechanisms that have been proposed to underlie these 
transitions, and summarized efforts to computationally 
simulate them. Using an agent based computer model of 
cultural evolution, we obtained support for the hypothesis 
that the onset of cumulative, open-ended cultural evolution 
can be attributed to the evolution of a self-triggered recall 
and rehearsal loop, enabling the recursive chaining of 
thoughts and actions. Using a generative genetic program-
ming system, we used a computational model of contextual 
focus to automatically produce a related series of art output 
that received critical acclaim usually given to human art 
work supporting the hypothesis that the capacity to shift 
between analytic and associative modes of thought plays 
an important role in the creative process. 
Our results suggest that the evolution of chaining and 
contextual focus made possible the open-ended cumulative 
creativity exhibited by computational models of language 
evolution (e.g. Kirby, 2001). Note that in chaining versus 
no chaining conditions the size of the neural network is the 
same, but how it is used differs. This suggests that it was 
not larger brain size per se that initiated the onset of cumu-
lative culture, but that larger brain size enabled episodes to 
be encoded in more detail, allowing more routes for re-
minding and recall, thereby facilitating recursive re-
description of information encoded in memory (Karmiloff-
Smith, 1992), thereby tailor it to the situation at hand. Our 
results suggest that it is reasonable to hypothesize that this 
in turn is vastly accentuated by the capacity to shift be-
tween associative and analytic different processing modes. 
We wish to acknowledge some limitations of this work. 
Chaining does not work, as in humans, by considering an 
idea in light of one perspective, seeing how that perspec-
tive modifies the idea, seeing how this modification sug-
gests a new perspective from which to consider the idea, 
and so forth. We are planning a more sophisticated imple-
mentation of that works more along these lines. Second, 
there is some irony in using an art program based on the 
genetic algorithm as a starting point to implement contex-
tual focus, which we have claimed is unique to the cultural 
evolution of ideas and has no counterpart in biological evo-
lution. Our goal here was to see if contextual focus ‘works’ 
at all; since this was successful, we will now move on to 
more cognitively plausible implementations. One of the 
projects currently underway is to implement contextual 
focus in the EVOC model of cultural evolution that was 
used for the ‘origin of creativity’ experiments. This is be-
ing carried out as follows. The fitness function will change 
periodically, so that agents find themselves no longer per-
forming well. They will be able to detect that they are not 
performing well, and in response, increase the probability 
of change to any component of a given action. This tempo-
rarily makes them more likely to “jump out of a rut” result-
ing in a very different action, thereby simulating the capac-
ity to shift to a more associative form of thinking. Once 
their performance starts to improve, the probability of 
change to any component of a given action will start to 
decrease to base level, making them less likely to shift to a 
dramatically different action. This helps them perfect the 
action they have already settled upon, thereby simulating 
the capacity to shift to a more associative form of thinking. 
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